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Weak institutions ought to deter foreign direction investment (FDI), and mass media stories highlight
China's institutional deficiencies, yet China is now one of the world's largest FDI destinations. This
incongruity characterizes China's paradoxical growth. Cross-country regressions show that China's
FDI inflow is not exceptionally large, given the quality of its institutions and its economic track record.
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be augmented by economic track record measures. Deng Xiaoping's 1993 "southern tour" heralded
sweeping reforms, and this regime shift is insufficiently reflected in commonly used measures of institutional
quality. China's FDI inflow surge after these reforms resembles similar post-regime shift surges in
the East Bloc, and so is also unexceptional. Recent arguments that China's FDI inflow is inefficiently
large because weak institutions deter domestic investment while special initiatives attract FDI are thus
either unsupported or not unique to China.
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1.    Introduction    
 
China now receives more foreign capital in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) than any 
other country, despite ongoing and sometimes vociferous criticism of the quality of its 
government in the foreign media.  This is curious because FDI involves much irreversible fixed 
investment, which is sensitive to investors’ perceptions of public policies and property rights.  
Does the quality of China’s government explain its FDI allure, or is China’s inflow of FDI in 
some sense “exceptional” given the quality of its government?   
This question has broad implications.  The development literature shows financial 
development, investment, and thus growth depending critically on the construction and 
maintenance of sound institutions – fundamental tasks of government and defining norms of 
“good government”.  FDI can be less affected by institutional deficiencies than domestic 
investment if foreign investors have better access to capital, or backing from their home 
governments in protecting their property rights.  In such situations, FDI can serve a critical 
development role.  Of course, arguments to the contrary are also plausible, for foreign investors 
can confront information asymmetries and discriminatory sentiments.  Hence this paper has 
multiple objectives.  On a broad level, it explores the relationships between various aspects of 
government quality and inward FDI.  On a country-specific level, it explores, within the context 
of such relationships, possible differences between FDI inflows to China and other countries at 
similar levels of development (as captured by per capita GDP).   
We first show how FDI inflows correlate across countries with three key dimensions of 
“good government.”  These are  
 
1.  The general quality of government.  To measure this, we use appraisals of official respect 
for private property rights and freedom from official corruption.   
2.  The strength of constraints on executive power.  Here again we use appraisals, but 
focusing specifically on the freedom of action the country’s institutions accord its head of   2
government.  Intuitively, constraints on executive power prevent a country’s head of 
government from ruling by decree, arbitrarily nullifying or modifying contracts or 
property rights, and capriciously altering the rules of the economic game in other ways.  
If executive actions hinge on legislatures being consulted and court rulings being sought 
amid an open competition for the right to govern, a country’s future policy direction is 
less likely to be arbitrary and opportunistic.       
3.  The government’s track record.  A government that has overseen more impressive 
economic growth in the past is likely to draw more FDI than other countries with 
similarly appraised institutions.  We therefore consider past economic growth as an 
implicit measure of government track record.      
Within this framework, we show that FDI inflow correlates with a country’s economic 
growth track record, both its magnitude and stability, and with its general institutional quality, as 
captured by the “rule of law.”  We find no China effect; for China dummies are insignificant – 
both as intercept adjusters and slop shifters for institutional quality variables.  We confirm an FDI 
inflow surge into China following a marked regime change in 1993, but the effect readily fades 
with time; and a like pattern is evident in Eastern Bloc transition economies.  Any apparently 
anomalous ‘China effect’ is readily explained by conditioning FDI inflow on track record in 
sustaining past growth, as well as obvious controls for log population size, adults as a fraction of 
total population, trade over GDP, exchange rates, and time dummies.   
We surmise three conclusions from our findings:    
  
1.  High quality government attracts FDI.  The most significant such qualities are respect for 
the “rule of law” and a solid track record in overseeing strong and stable economic 
growth.  We find that “limits” on executive power” matter less clearly, perhaps reflecting 
difficulties in quantifying that variable or an unstable relationship with FDI.       3
2.  China’s large FDI inflow is not mysterious.  Its high level is concordant with its growth 
track record and its size, demographic appeal, openness, etc.  The institutional variables 
are not important in explaining China’s high FDI inflow because China’s institutions are 
rated only slightly higher than those of other countries at similar per capita GDP levels. 
3.  These results suggest that China’s FDI inflow is not abnormally large.  In particular, it 
does not accord with China’s pro-inward FDI policies letting foreigners grab excessive 
shares of China’s investment opportunities while China’s poor institutions discourage 
domestic capital formation. (See Huang 2003.)  Or, if such a phenomenon is present, it is 
also present in enough other countries to render Chinese data non-anomalous.   
The next section motivates our research question.  Section three describes our general 
views on inward FDI and the quality of governments and institutions.  Section four reports the 
empirical tests that educe our conclusions.  Section five uses these results to understand China’s 
high FDI inflows relative to those into countries with comparable incomes.  Section six discusses 
issues regarding the institutional variables their effects on regression explaining inward FDI.   
Section seven concludes that “too much” FDI is not flowing into China.   
 
2.   Issues 
The importance of sound institutions to economic development is now received wisdom.   Solid 
property rights protection and respect for the rule of the law are viewed as basic factors that 
determine macroeconomic stability, capital market development, business sector development, 
and investment in innovation – see La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Acemoglu et al. (2003), Durnev 
et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2005), and many others.  The successful development and 
maintenance of sound institutions is therefore now seen as a critical function of government; 
indeed, as a fundamental test of “good government”.     4
  From this perspective China’s economic growth seems a puzzle.  China features a one 
party political monopoly.  By most reckoning, democracy and political transparency are not 
integral to the Chinese polity.  Stories of corruption, scandals, and embezzlement starring 
government bureaucrats, bank executives and corporate insiders contribute to a general 
perception of weak property rights.  More formal evaluations of the quality of Chinese 
institutions concur with these impressions.   
  Table 1 shows China’s ‘rule of law’ exceeding levels in both the former Eastern Bloc and 
Latin America, though its score on corruption is weaker.  But China’s growth outpaces both of 
these other regions.  This success understandably draws economists, such Allen, Qian, and Qian 
(2005) and others, to envision a “Chinese model” of development that permits vigorous growth 
despite feeble institutions.    
  But Table 1 also sounds a note of caution.  China’s per capita GDP is markedly lower 
than the averages for either the Eastern Bloc or Latin America.  This low starting point gives 
China more room than most countries to grow simply by catching up.  Even though many equally 
poor countries do not manage to grow rapidly, a low starting point makes China’s rapid per capita 
GDP growth rate less impressive: any capital allocated to any entrepreneur may well generate 
quick economic growth.   
  A full analysis of the importance of political economy to economic development is 
clearly beyond the scope of this study.  We focus on only one factor in economic development –
FDI inflow – and thus investigate only one small part of a greater picture.  We adopt this focus 
because investment is a key determinant of growth.  Foreigners’ capital is more footloose than 
domestic capital, and is thus more sensitive to outside opportunities.  Foreign investment ought 
therefore to be more sensitive to institutional deficiencies.      
  If foreign capital flowing into China is unaffected by the institutional factors that 
determine the allocation of foreign capital elsewhere, there may well be a distinct “Chinese 
model”.  One plausible possibility is that foreign investors are undeterred by China’s inadequate   5
institutions because the Chinese government favors them (Huang 2003).  Another is that foreign 
investors are overenthusiastic about China’s potential. But if the same determinants affect FDI 
allocation in China as elsewhere, Chinese exceptionalism is rendered dubious.  Of course, its 
domestic savings might still be allocated uniquely; but even if this were so, our study narrows the 
scope for any possible Chinese singularity.   
  China surpassed the U.S. as the world’s largest FDI recipient in 2001. But China is a very 
large country – economically and geographically as well as in terms of population.  Comparisons 
across countries must be scaled by country size.  Table 1 shows China’s inward FDI as a fraction 
of GDP is larger than in either Latin America or the former Eastern Bloc, but smaller if measured 
per capita.  This makes sense because China’s low per capita GDP and large population make its 
absolute FDI inflow seem large, just as its rapid per capita GDP growth rates seem large, in part, 
because of its extremely low starting point  
  Figure 1 pursues this issue further.  Before 1993, China’s FDI falls short of the global 
average, regardless of whether it is expressed per capita or as a fraction of GDP.  But after a 
series of reforms begun in 1993, China’s FDI inflow surges.   From 1990 through 2003, FDI 
inflow averages 4.3% of GDP – double the world average of 2.1%.   But, FDI inflow per capita 
remains low.  Even the highest level it achieves in the data underlying Figure 1, about US$40 per 
capita, is only about one-fifth of the world average.  The world mean is heavily skewed by very 
high-income countries, like Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.  Only when judged against other 
countries with comparably low starting points does China’s FDI inflow seem impressive.  For 
example, for the period 1993 and beyond, China exceeds by almost 50% the average FDI per 
capita of the countries with comparable GDPs per capita.
1 
Thus, whether China’s performance is exceptional or not depends critically on how it is 
measured, against which benchmarks it is compared, and on how much of China’s economic 
                                                      
1 This point is elaborated in Table 2, discussed below.     6
performance can be dismissed as “easy growth” as the country catches up after decades of 
stagnation under Maoist socialism. 
  But let us accept that China’s ability to attract FDI is of economic interest, and seek an 
economic explanation of it.  Given this motivation, we use a straightforward empirical 
specification to consider two questions:   
1.  Is FDI allocation affected by government quality? 
2.  Is China’s FDI inflow exceptional, given the result in 1?   
To lay the groundwork for answering these questions, we next consider the determinants of FDI 
inflow. 
 
3.   The role of “good government” in attracting FDI  
The literature on FDI, though voluminous, points towards a relatively simple generic empirical 
specification.   
  The starting point of the modern FDI literature is the Coasean Theory of the Firm (Coase 
1937, Caves 1971, Buckley and Casson 1975, Caves 1982, and others).  In essence, prospective 
multinational firms are envisioned as possessing information-based firm-specific capabilities that 
they could profitably apply in foreign countries.  Indeed, these capabilities compensate for local 
firms’ “home court advantage” to let multinationals earn returns high enough to justify their 
investments abroad (Morck and Yeung 1991, 1992).  Agency problems, information asymmetries, 
and property rights protection problems render information-based assets inalienable, and so 
prevent these firms from selling or leasing their capabilities to foreign firms.  To apply their 
unique capabilities abroad profitably, multinationals must thus establish controlled foreign 
operations – i.e. engage in FDI.  The fundamental principle, however, is that FDI is an investment 
like any other – aiming to capture quasirents to realize a positive net present value (NPV).  
  The NPV of a corporate investment project of this sort depends on a multitude of factors.  
Caves (1982) draws attention to economy size in this context: a larger economy gives an   7
investment projects with higher fixed costs a higher NPV; so FDI inflow, all else equal, should be 
larger into larger economies.  The NPV a firm foresees also depends positively on local product 
and factor market development, growth potential, and the availability of financing; and negatively 
on market risks and costs of doing business.  The last is especially emphasized, and linked to high 
taxes, high wages relative to productivity, and generally poor infrastructure.
2 
All these factors, including the development of the financial system, depend on an 
economy’s institutional environment – its rules, regulations, and informal codes of behavior.  As 
described above, the commercial success of FDI hinges on how well a firm protects its property 
rights and overcomes a range of agency and information asymmetry problem; and foreign firms 
are particularly handicapped in achieving these goals, giving local firms their above mentioned 
home court advantage (Zaheer and Mosakawski 1997).  But, if locals make transparent and 
predictable use of practicable norms, legal systems, and political institutions to adjudicate 
disputes, this home court advantage diminishes and FDI flows in more abundantly.  This 
consideration echoes the more general finance and growth literature, which emphasizes how 
sound and well-enforced rules and regulations, like property rights protection and information 
disclosure, encourage economic development in general and capital market development in 
particular (La Porta et al., 1997 and 1998; King and Levine, 1993).  This is because such rules 
and regulations constrain opportunistic behavior and build transactional trust between contracting 
parties (North 1991).     
Establishing and administering sound rules and regulations requires “good government”.  
Governments that are less corrupt, have more efficient bureaucracies, and that impose less 
                                                      
2 Coughlin, Terza, and Arromdee (1991) provide empirical support for these factors influencing inward 
FDI, though they do not consider financial development.  Froot and Stein (1991), while showing that 
undervalued host country currencies attract inward FDI, also stress barriers firms confront in raising capital 
to finance new investment projects.  These barriers are particularly daunting for domestic firms in 
economies with underdeveloped capital markets.  In such countries, foreign firms could have an advantage 
in capturing the NPVs of new investment projects because of their access to better functioning foreign 
capital markets (Foley, Mahir, and Hines, 2004).  See also Dunning (1993) and Dunning and Zhang (2007) 
for the relationship between FDI, locational competitiveness, and other factors.   8
burdensome regulations foster economic development.  Alfaro et al. (2005) show that weak 
institutions explain why very little capital flows from rich to poor countries.  Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002) find preliminary evidence that FDI flows towards locations with sounder 
governance infrastructure, which includes how well the legal system enforces contracts and 
protects property rights, how free the government is from corruption, and how efficient the 
government is; that is, how well regulators and other bureaucrats avoid imposing unnecessarily 
burdensome regulations
3.  Their result could reflect countries with better institutions having 
stronger growth opportunities, which attract more FDI.     
  Governments are, of course, staffed by people.  Sound institutions require high quality 
government, and this requires well-qualified politicians and civil servants. Just as good corporate 
executives are products of good internal corporate governance, high quality politicians and civil 
servants arise from sound public institutions.  This circularity can lock in either good or bad 
government.   
The sort of circle into which a country fits determines critically its appeal as an FDI 
destination.  Transparent and orderly political competition, along with constraints on executive 
power, seems paramount.  Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find stronger constraints on government 
associated with less corruption and more predictable policies and regulations.  They unbundle 
institutions into those protecting contracts and those protecting property.  The former facilitate 
contractual arrangements between transacting parties; the latter constrain public officials from 
acting arbitrarily for personal gains.  Investment and growth appear better explained by property 
rights protection, while the former influence mainly the form of contracting that occurs.   
Constraints on executive power may be particularly worthy of attention when we 
examine countries that feature recent phenomenal growth.  These countries, of which China is 
one, need external capital to capture their growth opportunities.  To attract foreign capital, their 
                                                      
3 Their empirical results do not control for expected growth, so institutional factors might proxy for this, or 
for government behavior associated with expected future growth and thus with a need for FDI.    9
governments should be particularly enthusiastic about implementing and enforcing property 
rights, honoring policy commitments, and avoiding burdensome regulations.  But foreign 
investors’ concern is often not about such governments’ current stances, but about how they 
might act once the investments are in place – especially if growth and investment opportunities 
become less profuse.  Constraints on executive power prevent heads of government from abruptly 
altering property rights, revising policies, reneging on commitments, and capriciously imposing 
new regulations.  In short, they prevent short-term actions, like precipitous expropriations, in the 
event of negative shocks.  Executive constraints, especially if safeguarded by political 
competition, should reinforce the attractiveness of current sound policies to FDI by credibly 
assuring the permanence of those policies. 
In summary, basic economic and institutional factors attract FDI inflow.  The economic 
factors include the size of the market, the current level of development, and factors like education 
and infrastructure development that affect productivity and future development potential.   
Obviously, other economic factors, notably trade openness and the host country’s currency (see, 
e.g., Froot and Stein 1991), affect the FDI flows too.  The institutional factors include general 
measures of “good government” such as the instillation of law and order in the public, high 
quality public officials, and the strength of constraints on executive power.  
 
4.    Empirical findings   
This section examines the international allocation of inward FDI, as tabulated the World Bank 
WDI database. Our dependent variable is per capita FDI in constant 2000 US dollars, winsorized 
at five percent.
4  We add a constant to this quantity because some countries have negative FDI 
                                                      
4 Winsorization prevents disproportionate influence of outliers due to measurement errors.  This variable is 
highly skewed:  its fifth and first percentiles value are -0.46  and -79.0, while its ninety-fifth and ninety-
ninth percentiles are 527.8  and 1064.0. Its minimum is -2615 and its maximum is 259837.  The results are 
qualitatively similar when we winsorize at the first or fifth percentiles.  However, giving the five percent 
threshold is around 0 (instead of -79 at the one percent level), interpreting magnitudes is simpler, for   10
inflows (negative FDI inflow represents repatriation of previous investment).
5   Dropping the 
negative FDI inflow observations leads to qualitative similar results.  However, we are not aware 
of persuasive economic reasons to exclude these observations.  
  We reiterate here our twofold intentions.  First, we wish to investigate empirically our 
thesis that “good government” attracts FDI.  Second, we wish to see if the FDI flowing into China 
behaves similarly to that flowing into other countries.  To these ends, following the discussion 
above, we regress each country’s FDI inflow on a set of country characteristics associated with 
the quality of government, along with some basic measures of the level of development and other 
country characteristics such as the population size, demographic characteristics and trade policies.  
We include China in these regressions and then ask whether China-specific dummies are 
significant.   
 
Focal independent variables 
Our focal independent variables are “quality of government” measures.  Following the discussion 
above, we include three sets of these.     
 
Constraints on executive power 
We use two variables to capture the strength of constraints on executive power.   
  Executive constraints, from the Polity IV database, ranges from 1 to 7.  It is composed of 
indexes that gauge barriers to political entry (monarchy through dictatorship to open entry), the 
nature of political transitions (orderly or military), and the selection of successors (genetics 
through appointment to open election).  This variable therefore captures the strength of 
                                                                                                                                                              
log(FDI per capita + constant) is closer to log(FDI per capita) if the constant is 0.5, instead of 80, and log 
differences can be interpreted as percentage differences.   
5 In total, 6.3% of the observations are negative.  We add 0.5 to FDI per capita so the minimum of the 
winsorized FDI per capita is positive.     11
institutionalized constraints on the decision making power of a country’s chief executives.  The 
larger the number is, the stronger the constraints.     
  Responsible government  is constructed from the Polity IV database and rates each 
country on a democracy-autocracy scale.  First, in the data base an autocracy variable is available, 
ranging from 0 to 10, with a larger number indicating a more autocratic government.  Also 
available is an analogous democracy index ranges from 0 to 10, but with a larger number means a 
more democratic government.  Our responsible government variable is the democracy index 
minus the autocracy index, a measure called polity2 in the database. It captures the extent to 
which a political regime is responsible to its people, the larger the number the stronger the 
democratic checks on the political system.   
 
General institutional quality  
In addition to our executive power limitation variables, we consider a commonly-used measure of 
the general quality of government: the rule of law index from ICRG.  This is a survey result 
gauging the state of law and order in each country.  It ranges from 1 to 6, with higher values 
connoting greater general respect for the rule of law.
6   It contains a law component, which 
captures the strength and impartiality of the legal and political establishment in judicial matters, 
and an order component, which captures the extent to which residents of a country accept 
established legal and political institutions as the solely legitimate way to make and implement 
laws and to adjudicate disputes.    
  We also adopt International Country Risk Guide’s corruption index as our freedom from 
corruption index; this measure is most commonly used in the related economics literature, and 
also has the widest coverage of the standard corruption indices.  This variable gauges corruption 
as the incidence of high government officials demanding special payments, and of illegal 
                                                      
6 ICRG data has the advantage of covering the majority of countries from 1982 on. For details, see Knack 
and Rahman (2007).   12
payments being expected throughout low levels of government.  In addition to being consistent 
with previous studies, the variable has the advantage of having the broadest coverage of 
countries, which maximizes our sample size.  The index itself takes on values ranging from zero 
(most corrupt) to six (least corrupt); and hence falls with rising corruption.  
 
Government track record 
A government’s track record plays an interesting role.  As explained in the previous section, FDI 
is large where foreign corporate investors regard investment opportunities highly.  Obviously, 
investment opportunities are more abundant where institutions are better, where government 
officials less corrupt, bureaucracies more efficient, and the rule of law more generally upheld.  
Yet positive shocks to investment opportunities can also entice governments seeking to attract 
foreign capital to provide such institutions.  Hence, a simple relationship between measures of 
government quality and FDI could be misleading.  At the very least, to sort this out, our empirical 
investigation should incorporate a proxy for the presence of profitable investment opportunities.  
This is the track record of the government, which we measure in two ways.   
  Growth trend is a country’s per capita GDP growth rate, averaged over the prior five 
years.  We interpret rapid past growth as indicative of both profitable investment opportunities 
and a government able to foster, or at least not impede, their exploitation. 
  Macro volatility is the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth over the prior five 
years.  Less stable growth, all else equal, is less conducive to FDI, and less indicative of sound 
and predictable government policies. 
 
Control variables 
Alongside our focal independent “quality of government” measures, we also include set of 
variables capturing other economy characteristics likely to be associated with higher FDI inflow.  
These are:   13
General economy development 
We gauge general development using the following variables: log of per capita GDP in 2000 
constant US dollars; education measured by the log of years of schooling, averaged across all the 
country’s residents; infrastructure quality, represented by telephones per thousand residents; and 
level of urbanization,
7 urban population as a fraction of total population. This set of variables is 
commonly used elsewhere in the literature (see e.g. Coughlin et al. 1991).   
 
Other economy characteristics 
Based on the discussion in the previous section, we include set of country characteristics.  We 
include country size, measured as the log of total population, to control for scale economies 
attainable in each country. Because a country’s productivity and growth are positively associated 
with the proportion of its population who are working age adults (Mason 2007), we also include 
adults as a fraction of the population.
8   China is currently enjoying a demographic growth 
dividend; the decline in its birth rate since 1949, and particularly so since 1959, is now swelling 
its working age adult population.  
  We further include a measure of openness, import plus export as a fraction of GDP, for 
two reasons.
9  Openness reduces the utility of FDI for jumping trade barriers.  But more open 
countries are also more attractive places to site e.g. vertically related FDI.  Openness might also 
reduce information asymmetry for potential foreign investors, and might correlate with a variety 
of positive economy features.  The variable is lagged one period to mitigate endogeneity issues.    
  We also include the exchange rate of each country’s currency relative to the US dollar, 
normalized by the 2000 rate.  This means a higher value of exchange rate implies a more 
                                                      
7 We have also tried including the percent of GDP accounted by manufacturing and services, and found that 
they don't matter for attracting FDI after controlling for GDP per capita, urbanization, and other controls. 
8 Adults are defined to be between the age of 15 and 64. 
9 We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion.    14
depreciated local currency.  Countries with undervalued currencies, all else equal, attract more 
FDI (see e.g. Froot and Stein, 1991).     
  While we introduce these variables as controls, they are also, in part at least, reflections 
on the quality of each country’s government and institutions.  Better governed countries typically 
have more telephones per capita, more educated people, more trade openness, and currencies that 
better hold their values.   This may even apply to population, for emigration is a common 
response to misrule.  Including these controls thus biases our analysis against finding significant 
results for our focal ‘quality of government’ variables.     
 
China dummies 
Because our objective is to see if China’s FDI inflow is “exceptional”, we include a China 
dummy, δChina, in the regressions.  If this variable is significant, China differs on average from 
other countries after conditioning on the variables mentioned above.   
  We further employ a regime shift dummy.  Observers of Chinese economy know that 
1993 marks a turning point – Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour – which sent a strong signal to the 
world of China’s commitment to economic liberalization.  Such a regime shift can cause a surge 
of investment (Henry, 2000) that subsequently abates over time.  We therefore create a post 1993 
dummy, δ t > 1993, and include in the regression two additional variables: China post 1993 ≡ δChina 
× δ t > 1993,, and China post 1993 trend ≡ δChina × δ t > 1993 × (t – 1993), where t measures time; the 
former captures the response of FDI to a significant regime shift, and later detects the extent to 
which the effect fades with time.  
 
Regression Specification and sample 
Our regression specification is thus: 
it it it
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where Xit is a vector of variables related to general development and economy characteristics –
including log GDP per capita, log(mean years of schooling), telephone density, urban share of 
population, adult share of population, log population, exchange rate, and openness – and Zit is a 
vector of institutional quality measures.  We divide these into two parts: inst, containing 
responsible government, executive constraint, rule of law, and control of corruption, and track, 
containing measures of the government's track record – the growth trend of a country and the 
volatility of growth rate in the prior five years.  Since our institutional variables exhibit little 
variation over time, and fixed effects would exacerbate measurement problem (Griliches and 
Hausman, 1986), we rely on ordinary least square to estimate our regressions, but cluster by 
country when estimating standard errors (Moulton, 1986).  Using random-effects estimation 
generates qualitatively similar results. 
  Data from 1961 to 2003 for the following 61 countries are included in specifications 
using the institutional variables executive constraints or responsible government (both from the 
PolityIV database): Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, 
India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lao PDR, Liberia, Mali, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, 
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Swaziland, Syrian, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen.  In specifications for which the 
institutional variable is the rule of law (from ICRG), we can use data for 120 countries from 1982 
and 2001 for the -based regressions.
10  Our sample is thus constrained by the differing coverage 
of the two datasets.  Observations with missing data for any variables are dropped.  Rule of law is 
missing less frequently than executive constraint or responsible government; but is available over 
                                                      
10 The list of countries is available upon request.   16
a shorter panel – 1982 through 2001.  Restricting all our regressions to this shorter period 
generates qualitatively identical results.   
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports standard descriptive statistics for our variables across the relevant samples of 
countries.  We present four samples: a pooled sample excluding China (using the combined 
sample for regressions with the polity IV variables and with rule of law), China before 1993, 
China after 1993, and a “similar income countries” subsample after 1993.  The last consists of 
1993 - 2003 data on countries whose GDP per capita is bounded by China's minimum and 
maximum GDP between 1993 and 2003 (excluding China, of course).    
  The interesting observations from Table 2 are as follows.  First, China’s FDI inflow 
clearly rises substantially after 1993 – more than thirty-fold.  Obviously, China’s per capita 
income also gallops forward during this period, as the country starts catching up with the rest of 
the world.  Second, while China’s limits on executive power (as captured by responsible 
government and executive constraints) change little, and remain below the average and the 
average for countries at similar income levels, its general institutional quality (as captured by the 
rule of law and control of corruption)  paints a more complicated picture.  China’s rule of law 
rises from well below the global average and the average for countries at similar income levels to 
well above both.  China’s freedom from corruption, however, deteriorates over time, falling to 
levels typical of countries with comparable incomes per capita.  
 
Regression results 
Table 3 describes our cross-country regressions.  For each institutional variable, we present 
results both with and without the China 1993 dummy and China 1993 trend – with the former in 
odd and the latter in even number columns.       17
  High scores for good government generally accompany high FDI inflows.  A good 
government track record also accompanies a high FDI inflow, for past average growth attracts a 
positive significant coefficient and elevated growth rate volatility attracts a negative coefficient.  
General government quality, our rule of law variable, is statistically significantly associated with 
higher FDI inflows.  Overall, FDI inflows correlate positively with a government’s track record 
and the prevalence of the rule of law – the quality of government matters. 
 The  strength  of  limits on executive power is statistically insignificant in explaining FDI 
inflow.  This may reflect mismeasurement; for the variables in this category are revised slowly 
despite obvious changes in reality.  Take China as a case in point – while Chinese governance 
changed markedly over the past two decades, this is reflected in neither of the two indicators in 
Table 2.  In contrast, the rule of law variable captures subjective impressions by foreign investors, 
and is perhaps a more up-to-date snapshot of reality. 
  Another puzzle is the utter insignificance of freedom from corruption, contrary to our 
expectations.  A possible interpretation is that corruption is less damaging to FDI than the popular 
press claims.  If foreign investors regard bribery as a cost of doing business, and high bribes are 
repaid with other breaks, like low formal taxes or regulatory privileges, FDI might proceed apace.  
While opaque and unpredictable government is detrimental to efficient and effective business 
operations, this effect is also perhaps better captured by the rule of law variable.  
  Some evidence links trade orientation to FDI.  While lagged trade over GDP is 
insignificantly associated with FDI per capita if the institutional variables are executive constraint 
or responsible government, it becomes highly positive and significant if rule of law is used.  
Intriguingly, the other variables are rarely consistently significant and robust.  Two exceptions are 
that greater urbanization is associated with more FDI inflow per capita that FDI inflow per capita 
exhibits a strong positive global time trend.   
  To account for China’s 1993 regime shift, we use our China post 1993 dummy and China 
post 1993 trend. The former captures any discrete FDI response to the regime shift, while the   18
latter gauges how fast any FDI impulse fades over time.  These terms attract positive and a 
negative significant coefficient respectively.  After 1993 China’s FDI inflow per capita jumps by 
108 to 172 log points, all else equal, and its growth rate in FDI per capita drops by 11 to 15 
percent per annum subsequently.  Thus by the end of our sample period, the jump is largely 
dissipated.
11     
  Chinese data appear unexceptional, for the China dummy is statistically insignificant and 
unstable of sign.  This is so regardless of whether or not we include or exclude regime change 
variables.  Thus, China seems little different from other countries in terms of its FDI inflow per 
capita once we incorporate appropriate controls.  There is no Chinese exceptionalism.   
  A reasonable concern here is that we ignore regime changes in other countries, but not in 
China.  If regime changes are correlated across countries, our regression results may be biased.  A 
full fledged inquiry into worldwide policy regime changes and FDI allocation is far beyond the 
scope of this study, but we can explore how our estimates might be affected by incorporating 
other countries’ well-known policy regime changes.  Also, we can check if the impulse response 
to China’s regime shift is similar to that accompanying other countries’ regime shifts.  We focus 
on the transition to market economy by former Eastern Bloc countries, and construct three 
variables: Eastern Bloc (a dummy marking Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries), 
Eastern Bloc post-1990, and Eastern Bloc post-1990 trend, defined precisely analogously to 
China post 1993 and China post 1993 trend.  The Berlin Wall fell on Nov 9, 1989 so we take 
1990 as the defining moment for regime change in the Eastern Bloc.      
  Table 4 shows that Eastern Bloc countries resemble China.  Their 1990 transition 
presages an immediate jump in FDI inflow per capita.  This jump is larger than China’s – 500 to 
620 log points.  A decline in growth rates after 1990 is also evident, and is again more dramatic 
                                                      
11 For example, using column six, the jump effect and the time trend effect offset each other in between the 
7
th and the 8
th year, i.e., around 2000.   19
than in China.  The Eastern Bloc dummy itself attracts a negative and significant coefficient, and 
impulse response does not dissipate totally within our sample period, as China’s does.   
  While all these findings are interesting per se, and clearly warrant further investigation, 
we return to our main focus.  Allowing for similar important regime shifts elsewhere does not 
alter our results regarding China. The China dummy remains broadly insignificant (except in 
column 2, where it is negative and marginally significant).  Our other results also remain intact: 
track record and the rule of law remain positive and significant; limits on executive power and 
freedom from corruption remain insignificant; and the China impulse response coefficients are 
not materially changed.       
  Another angle from which to explore China’s possible uniqueness is that the institutional 
variables might matter differently for China versus other countries.  To explore this, we interact 
the institutional and government track record variables with the China dummy.  Table 5 shows 
that none of these interaction terms are statistically significant.   
  In summary, we find FDI attracted to countries with good government track records, as 
indicated by stable and high prior growth, and with high quality governments, as captured by the 
prevalence of the rule of law.  Other popular measures of the quality of government – freedom 
from corruption and limits on executive power – do not significantly affect FDI inflows.   
Important pro-business policy regime shifts have the expected effect of attracting surges of FDI, 
which fade over time.  Most importantly, we find no Chinese exceptionalism regarding FDI 
inflow.  China’s FDI inflow is neither higher than in other countries nor differently related to 
institutional quality variables once obvious controls are included.   
 
5.    FDI allocation – China and the world compared 
We now turn to the economic significance of our regression findings in comparing FDI inflows 
into China and other countries.  For comparison, we select a comparison group (CG) of countries   20
whose GDP per capita between 1993 and 2003 is bounded by China's minimum and maximum 
GDP in the same period.  China's FDI per capita exceeds that for the comparison group by 101 
log points in 1993, and 121 log points in 2001.
12  Given this, how do our regression results 
explain China’s per capita FDI premium with differences in the values of the regressors?   
  Regression [1] lets us decompose the per capita FDI inflow differential between China 
and the CG into a component explained by the observable variables, Z (limits on executive power, 
general government quality, government track record, general development proxies, and proxies 
for  other characteristics) and by the China specific unobservables as captured by the China 
dummies in equation 1.  For expository convenience, we focus on two years: 1993, is the water 
shed year of China’s commitment to economic reforms signaled by Deng Xiaoping’s Southern 
Tour and 2001, and the end of the year of our sample. In percentage terms, the observables 
explain the premium by  ) ( ) ( , , , , t CG t china t CG t china Z Y Y Z Z − − β while the unobservable explains 
the premium by  ) ( ) ( , , 1 t CG t china china Y Y − +γ α   in 1993 and by 
) ( ) 8 ( , , 2 1 t CG t china china Y Y − × + + γ γ α  in 2001.  The results are reported in Table 6, the four 
column panels correspond to the regressions 2, 4, 6, and 8 in Table 3, respectively.   
  First, most obviously the chief factor that propels China’s per capita FDI above countries 
of similar income is its economic track record – the past high and stable average growth account 
for about 46% to more than 100% of the FDI premium.  The effect is larger in the 2001 year than 
in the 1993 year.  
  Second, equally impressive is the contribution of adult (age 15 to 64) population share to 
China’s FDI premium, which accounts for 45% to 80% of China’s FDI premium over similar 
income countries.  While the magnitude is slightly small in 2001 than in 1993, the difference is 
limited.  Clearly, the attraction of China’s working age adult for FDI exists.  Perhaps, that is part 
                                                      
12 This is only approximately true.  Our dependent variable is ln(0.5+FDI per capita), which is very close to 
ln(FDI per capita) when FDI per capita is around 20 to 30 dollars per capita.   21
of China’s demographic dividends.  The track record on growth and the demographic attraction 
together essentially accounts for more than a hundred percent of the China FDI inflow premium.   
  Third, China’s large population naturally serves to dampen the magnitude of China’s per 
capita FDI inflow.  When we combine this factor with the demographic composition factor, 
which provides the opposite effect, the net magnitude is very “tame,” about 21% in 1993 and 
15% on the down size of the difference between FDI inflow in China and similar income 
countries. However, we add the caveat here that both the population and the adult population 
share variables are not significant explanatory variables in the base regressions in Table 3.   
   Fourth, the collection of the general development factors serves to press China’s per 
capita FDI inflow below similar income countries in 1993 but the effect reverses sign in 2001 as a 
result of China’s fast development.  Among the factors, urbanization is the most critical factor: in 
1993, the lack of urbanization presses China’s FDI inflow down by 28% of the gap it has with 
similar income countries; the magnitude shrinks to 9.5% in 2001.  Our most preferred set up, 
which is the third panel where the institutional variable used, the rule of law, is significant in the 
original regression reported in Table 3.  In this set up, the general development factors lift China 
per capital FDI above similar countries and account for 30% of the premium.     
   Fifth, China’s lower degree of openness reduces its FDI attraction, compared to similar 
countries.  But the effect is rather limited; it presses China’s FDI inflow down the gap it has with 
similar income countries by 16% and 13% in 1993 and 2001, respectively.  But these magnitudes 
are much smaller than that those due to China’s growth track record.  Note that the exchange rate 
factor has negligible economic significance.   
  Six, the set of China dummies reveals that the “impulse response” to China’s 1993 strong 
signal for economic reforms raises the FDI inflows but the effect is dampened substantially in 
2001.  In our most preferred set up, reported in the third column panel, the effect all but 
disappeared, as we also described earlier.    22
  Seven, institutions do not play any significant role in causing the gap between the FDI 
inflow to China and similar income countries. Compared with similar income countries, China 
has worse limits on executive power but actually a better survey record on the rule of law, the 
former negatively and the latter positively impact on China’s inflow FDI premium over similar 
income countries. The control for corruption gives a more mixed picture: China was on record 
better than similar income country in 1993 and worse in 2001.  Given that among the four 
variables only the rule of law is significant (see Table 3), we focus on it.  The variable contributes 
44% to China’s inflow FDI premium over similar countries in 1993 and only 17% in 2001.  These 
magnitudes, while not negligible, are substantially smaller than the effects due to China’s growth 
track record and demography, especially in 2001.   
  In summary, we find that China's per capita FDI premium over similar income countries 
is largely due to its record of high and stable growth rate and its demographic appeal.  China’s 
fast growth allows it to catch up with similar income countries in infrastructure development, and 
urbanization so that these factors do not cause much difference between per capita FDI inflows 
into China and similar income countries.  The same applies to China’s openness and exchange 
rate policies.  Finally, while we find that the rule of law attracts FDI, survey record on China’s 
rule of law is actually better than similar income countries and it positively impacts on China’s 
FDI premium, although the dominant forces are still China’s highly regarded growth record and 
demographic appeal.  
 
6.  Do institutions matter?   
One prime objective of our investigation is on whether FDI allocation is affected by the quality of 
government and more broadly institutions.  Answer to the question is not obvious.  On the one 
hand, the law and development literature leads many to believe that a positive relationship exists; 
in particular, foreign investors face exacerbated information asymmetry and institutional 
discrimination problems.  On the other hand, FDI, compared to domestic investment, might be   23
less affected by inadequate institutions because foreign investors may have better access to 
capital and may have home authorities’ backing in protecting their rights.  Multinationals often 
have a large network of subsidiaries and can utilize the extensive system to raise its bargaining 
power against rent-extracting politicians and thus its ability to protect property rights (Zhao, 
2006). Moreover, while poor institutions discourage domestic capital formation, politicians may 
actually show favoritism to foreign direct investors (see Huang (2003) for the case in China).   
  Our results show a qualified affirmative answer: based on cross country panel data, we 
show that both “rule of law” and a good government track record, as registered by high and stable 
prior growth, attract FDI.  A more conservative interpretation of the result is that, controlling for 
past growth record to proxy for expectations of future growth, “rule of law” attracts FDI.   
However, FDI inflows are not reliably related to limits on executive power or freedom from 
corruption.  These mixed results are worthy of further discussion.          
  The insignificance of freedom from corruption is not inexplicable.  Bribes can become 
part of the cost of doing business; and for foreign firms with bargaining power, high bribes can be 
offset with tax or regulatory privileges.  This does not necessarily undermine previous work 
relating government transparency and predictability to efficient and effect business operations, 
but this effect might be more effectively captured by rule of law, which contains more time 
variation in our panel data. 
  Several important considerations arise in linking institutional variables to FDI inflows.  
In the following discussion, China is often an instructive case in point.  
 
How representative are the variables?  
The significance of the rule of law and insignificance of executive constraints and responsible 
government variables are revealing, for measurement errors can render the relationship between a 
proxy and FDI insignificant even if the relationship between the unobservable underlying variable   24
and FDI does exist.   In other words, the rule of law may perform well because it more adequately 
represents true institutional quality than the other two.    
 Consider  China’s  responsible government index: which is invariant at -7.0 (from a range 
of -10 to 10) throughout our sample period.  Similar income countries’ average score is 4.35; and 
needless to say China’s score is poor.  Similarly, China scores a 3.0 (from a range of 1 to 7) in 
constraints on executive power every year.  Similar income countries’ score is 5.42.  These data 
clearly suggest that throughout our sample period, Chinese leaders face few constraints and little 
political competition, even compared to similar income countries.   
  Now consider China’s rule of law index, which averages 3.12 (from a range of 1 to 6) 
between 1982 and 1993, but rises to average 4.86 between 1994 to 2001. Similar income 
countries’ scores average only 3.13.   
  The values of these indexes, benchmarked against averages for other weak institution 
countries, warrant suspicion.  Why do China’s miserable responsible government and constraints 
on executive power scores not match its decent rule of law score?  Why are the former two 
invariant over time, while the later rises robustly?  One possibility is that the first two are based 
on “expert assessments” while the “rule of law” score is a survey result.     
 Obviously,  China’s  wretched  responsible government score derives from being a 
communist country.  But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is far from homogeneous.  It has 
numerous factions at both the central and provincial levels.  This internal competition resembles, 
in some ways, the factional disputes in, for example, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party.  Just as 
LDP factional struggles constrain the Japanese prime minister’s freedom of action, disagreements 
within the CCP increasingly constrain the discretionary power of China’s top leaders.  Although 
these disputes were present to some degree through most of the history of the People’s Republic, 
the secretive and sometimes bloody power struggles of the 20
th century seem to be giving way to 
more orderly ways of debating policy and handling, for example, the succession of power (see 
Keefer, 2006).  Perhaps China’s leaders really do not have the same unbridled executive powers   25
wielded by dictators elsewhere in the developing world.  Perhaps the construction of neither the 
constraints on executive power nor the responsible government variables (section 4) adequately 
captures this rising competition within the Party.  It seems likely that competition within the CCP 
reflects competition to bolster the proceeds of economic growth accruing to various factions of 
the population and economic interest groups.  If so, China’s responsible government and 
constraints on executive power scores might genuinely be “too low”?  And if China’s responsible 
government and constraints on executive power scores are unrepresentative, might those of other 
countries be questioned too?  
  The rule of law score tells a different story.  Again, we use China as a case in point.  
While the executive constraints variables are constructed mechanically by applying rules 
assembled by experts to variables reflecting the formal structures of governments, the rule of law 
variable is a survey result.  The former may well miss practical changes of the sort discussed 
above, but we must also concede potential problems with survey data. The survey variable, of 
necessity, reflects foreign investors’ post-entry rationalizations, not their pre-entry fears.  By self-
selection and through the power of cognitive dissonance, the former are generally more positive 
than the latter.  Foreign investors with very negative views likely stay away, or leave early.  
Those with excessively positive views likely enter and stay on, and having done so, rationalize 
their decisions ex post.  Also, foreigners might select locations within China where the rule of law 
is unusually strong; or government officials might treat foreigners with greater respect.  In these 
ways, survey scores might actually overestimate rule of law and, since foreigners with more 
positive ex post views may well have invested more, risk inducing a mechanical positive ex post 
relationship between FDI and survey scores.  Further distortions might arise because of typical 
endogeneity problems.   
   26
Options on Institutions 
Another plausible explanation of insignificance of constraints on executive power is that foreign 
corporate investors anticipate increasingly effective constraints on executive power in the near 
future.  Again, China is a case in point.  This is a bet on a country’s future institutional 
development, but such bets can be sound investments for their upside potential can greatly 
outweigh their downside risks.  Indeed many corporate investments derive at least part of their 
values from such real options.  Option-based investments could also weaken the relationship 
between FDI and checks on executive power.  
 
7.    Is “Too Much” FDI Flowing into China?  
Our primary research question is whether or not China is attracting too much FDI given its well-
known institutional inadequacies and questionable government quality.  Our answer is “probably 
not.”   
  We estimate a cross-country FDI model that explains inward FDI using measures of the 
strength of constraints on executive power along with more general measures of government 
quality and track record at fostering growth plus controls for general development levels and key 
country characteristics.  In this model, we also incorporate an “impulse” response to China’s 
major 1993 economic reforms.  We find that China’s FDI inflow aligns well with what our model 
predicts – as regards both its level and its relationship to institutional quality and government 
track record variables.  Although the 1993 reforms clearly induce and FDI impulse response, 
which declined significantly over time, a similar phenomenon is evident in former Eastern Bloc 
countries.  Again, China is unexceptional.   
  What the regressions reiterate is that FDI is attracted by sound track records of 
governments overseeing high and stable growth.  This clearly favors China, and predominates in 
explaining China’s FDI inflow.  High rule of law scores also attract FDI, but China scores little   27
worse in rule of law than other countries at similar income levels.  If there is any Chinese 
exceptionalism, it is that country’s relatively high and relatively stable prior growth.  Parsing the 
difference between FDI into China and into countries at similar income levels supports no other 
conclusion.   
  Our results cast doubt on the hypothesis of a uniquely Chinese institutional bias favoring 
inward FDI (Huang 2003).  This bias is hypothesized because China’s weak institutions may 
deter domestic firms from realizing investment opportunities even as tax incentives, special 
property rights protection, and other government policies favoring FDI present those same 
opportunities to foreign firms.  If this were the case, our China dummy should have attracted a 
significant positive coefficient, or significantly shifted the slopes of key institutional variables.  
This is not observed.  Either FDI is not crowding out domestic firms’ investment in China or a 
similar phenomenon is sufficiently widespread in other developing economies as to render China 
again unexceptional.     
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Table 1.  Key Statistics for China, the Former Eastern Bloc, and Latin America 
Figures are averages over 1993 through 2003, and across all countries in Latin American or the 
former Eastern Bloc.     





Economic performance     
Per capita GDP (US dollars)  761.8 2251.9  2923.8 
Average annual GDP growth   8.4% 2.7% 0.7% 
Foreign investment     
Inward FDI per capita (US Dollars)  $34.4 $89.6 $87.3 
FDI/GDP  4.7% 4.3% 3.1% 
Institutional development     
Respect for the rule of law  4.9 4.5 3.1 
Freedom from corruption  2.5 3.3 2.9 
Responsible government   -7.0 3.0 7.6 
Constraints on executive power  3.0 4.4 6.1 
 
“Respect for the rule of law” is an ICRG survey result gauging the state of law and order in each country.  
It ranges from 1 to 6, with higher values connoting greater general respect for the rule of law.  It contains a 
law component, which captures the strength and impartiality of the legal and political establishment in 
judicial matters, and an order component, which captures the extent to which residents of a country accept 
established legal and political institutions as the sole legitimate way to make and implement laws and to 
adjudicate disputes.  We report the average of the variable from 1993 to 2002. 
 
We also adopt International Country Risk Guide’s corruption index as our “freedom from corruption” 
index; this measure is most commonly used in the related economics literature, and also has the widest 
coverage among standard corruption indices.  This variable captures the likelihood that high government 
officials demand special payments, and the extent to which illegal payments are expected throughout low 
levels of government.  In addition to bringing consistency with previous studies, the broad coverage of 
countries preserves our sample size.  The index takes values ranging from zero (most corrupt) to six (least 
corrupt); and so falls with rising corruption. 
 
“Responsible government” is constructed from the Polity IV database and rates each country on a 
democracy-autocracy scale.  The database has an autocracy variable ranging from 0 to 10, with a larger 
number indicating a more autocratic government.  It also has analogous democracy index ranges from 0 to 
10, but with a larger number indicating more democratic government.  Our responsible government 
variable is the democracy index minus the autocracy index, a measure called polity2 in the database. It 
captures the extent to which a political regime is responsible to its people, the larger the number the 
stronger the democratic checks on the political system.   
  
“Constraints on executive power” is also from the Polity IV database, and ranges from 1 to 7 with higher 
values indicating stronger checks on heads of government.  It is composed of indexes that gauge barriers to 
political entry (monarchy to dictatorship to open entry), the nature of political transitions (orderly or 
military), and the selection of successors (genetics to appointment to open election).    
 
 
   
 Table 2. Summary statistics China and Comparison Countries   
 
Countries other 
than China  China before ‘93  China after ‘93 
Similar  income 
countries 
after‘93 
variable  mean sd mean Sd mean sd mean sd 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
FDI per capita  $99.62  157.47  $1.33 2.75 $33.9 3.51  $23.09  30.45 
 
Limits on Executive Power 
Executive constraints   5.03  2.3  2.42 0.66  3  0  5.42 2.44 
Responsible government  3.98 6.98 -7.58 0.66  -7  0  4.35 7.28 
 
General Institutional quality 
Rule of law   3.63 1.64 3.12 0.41 4.86 0.33 3.13 0.91 
Freedom from corruption  3.49 1.46 3.88 0.42 2.51 1.31  2.9  0.96 
 
Government track record 
Growth trend (per capita 
GDP)  1.27 2.78 6.01 2.52 8.31 1.49 0.81 2.89 
GDP growth standard dev  0.06 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 
 
General development 
Log of per capita GDP  7.78 1.58 5.04 0.55 6.65 0.27 6.64 0.25 
Log(mean years of school)  1.47 0.72 1.37 0.15 1.71 0.03 1.37 0.37 
Telephones per 1000 
people  162.76  199.24 3.53  2.16  86.46 63.12 28.01 23.24 
urban share of population   54.59 22.63 20.07  3.84  34.53  3.23  41.41 14.22 
 
Other characteristics 
log(population)   2.63 1.32  6.8  0.18 7.12 0.03 2.75 1.34 
adult share of population  58.97  6.5  59.45 4.32 67.96 0.72 56.17 4.26 
trade_GDP1   61.39 33.7 19.74 10.9 43.88 5.79 70.96  27.37 
exchange  rate  0.61 0.41 0.32 0.12 0.98 0.09 0.79 0.27 
 
Note.  Similar income countries are defined as countries whose GDP per capita is bounded above and 
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Table 3.  Regressions Explaining FDI Allocation across Countries 
Dependent variable in all regressions is log constant (0.5) plus per capita FDI inflow. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Limits on Executive Power 
Responsible government  0.031  0.032        
  (0.91)  (0.94)        
Executive constraints    0.049  0.052      
    (0.53)  (0.56)      
General gov quality  
Rule of Law      0.239  0.236    
      (3.21)***  (3.17)***    
Freedom from corruption         0.088  0.089 
        (0.99)  (0.98) 
Government track record 
Growth trend (per capita GDP)  0.172 0.171 0.170 0.169 0.102 0.102 0.114 0.114 
  (3.82)*** (3.79)*** (3.62)*** (3.58)*** (2.89)*** (2.89)*** (3.08)*** (3.08)*** 
GDP growth standard dev.  -3.089 -3.085 -3.610 -3.613 -6.198 -6.231 -6.064 -6.097 
  (1.77)* (1.75)* (2.04)**  (2.03)**  (3.28)*** (3.29)*** (3.12)*** (3.13)*** 
China dummies 
China  0.184 -0.267  -0.035  -0.450  0.239 0.002 0.328 -0.095 
  (0.20) (0.30) (0.04) (0.54) (0.54) (0.00) (0.70) (0.19) 
China post 1993   1.723   1.661   1.076   1.420 
   (4.98)***   (4.85)***   (4.44)***   (6.79)*** 
China post 1993 trend   -0.105   -0.114   -0.149   -0.145 
   (4.10)***   (4.26)***   (5.65)***   (3.10)*** 
General development 
Log of per capita GDP  0.069 0.038 0.093 0.065 0.153 0.151 0.190 0.184 
  (0.17) (0.09) (0.22) (0.15) (0.52) (0.51) (0.63) (0.61) 
Log(mean years of school)  -0.247 -0.231 -0.261 -0.248  0.181 0.181 0.139 0.140 
  (0.72) (0.67) (0.72) (0.68) (0.73) (0.73) (0.53) (0.54) 
Telephones per 1000 people  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (1.11) (1.17) (1.05) (1.10) (0.98) (0.99) (1.28) (1.30) 
urban share of population  0.030 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 
  (2.06)** (2.09)** (1.99)*  (2.02)** (1.77)* (1.78)* (1.64)  (1.65) 
Other characteristics 
Log of population  -0.225 -0.226 -0.235 -0.236 -0.170 -0.170 -0.177 -0.178 
  (1.57) (1.57) (1.60) (1.60) (1.47) (1.47) (1.44) (1.44) 
adult share of population  0.064 0.063 0.074 0.073 0.045 0.045 0.055 0.055 
  (1.23) (1.22) (1.43) (1.42) (1.27) (1.27) (1.52) (1.53) 
trade_GDP-1  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
  (0.85) (0.84) (0.80) (0.78) (2.29)** (2.28)** (2.25)** (2.24)** 
exchange rate  -0.284 -0.291 -0.288 -0.293 -0.302 -0.305 -0.190 -0.197 
  (0.78) (0.80) (0.78) (0.79) (0.85) (0.85) (0.50) (0.52) 
Year  0.050 0.048 0.053 0.051 0.076 0.076 0.083 0.082 
  (2.93)*** (2.74)*** (3.03)*** (2.84)*** (4.85)*** (4.81)*** (5.01)*** (4.97)*** 
Observations  1137 1137 1125 1125 1554 1554 1554 1554 
R-squared  0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent. t-stat in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for country-
level clustering.  The constant 0.5 is being added to FDI per capita to take into account the fact that some FDI inflows have negative value.   35
Table 4.  Regressions Explaining FDI Allocation across Countries 
Dependent variable in all regressions is log constant (0.5) plus per capita FDI inflow.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Limits on Executive Power 
Responsible government  0.002     
  (0.08)     
Executive  constraints   -0.021    
   (0.30)     
General government quality 
Rule of law      0.250   
     (3.34)***  
Freedom from corruption        0.083 
      (0.90) 
Government track record 
Growth trend (per capita GDP)  0.178 0.181 0.103 0.116 
  (4.11)*** (4.07)*** (2.89)*** (3.13)*** 
GDP per capita growth standard deviation  -3.991 -4.335 -6.537 -6.390 
 (2.58)**  (2.69)**  (3.50)***  (3.32)*** 
China effects 
China  -1.081 -1.188 -0.050 -0.120 
 (1.52)  (1.75)*  (0.11)  (0.23) 
China  post-1993  1.554 1.516 1.077 1.443 
  (4.95)*** (4.85)*** (4.43)*** (6.95)*** 
China  post-1993  trend  -0.094 -0.097 -0.146 -0.147 
  (3.82)*** (4.01)*** (5.39)*** (3.05)*** 
Eastern Bloc dummies 
Eastern Bloc  -4.199 -4.564 -3.512 -3.110 
  (11.71)*** (12.87)*** (10.83)***  (8.72)*** 
Eastern  Bloc  post-1990  5.859 6.226 5.073 5.115 
  (14.78)*** (18.40)*** (27.42)*** (22.93)*** 
Eastern Bloc post-1990 trend  -0.169  -0.174  -0.144  -0.192 
  (4.34)*** (4.40)*** (3.84)*** (4.22)*** 
General development 
Log of per capita GDP  0.051  0.053  0.153  0.191 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.51) (0.63) 
Log(mean years of schooling)  -0.031  -0.004  0.191  0.142 
  (0.11) (0.01) (0.77) (0.54) 
Telephones per 1000 people  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.69) (0.66) (0.80) (1.21) 
urban share of population  0.024  0.024  0.019  0.018 
  (1.77)* (1.71)* (1.78)*  (1.65) 
Other Characteristics 
Log of population, adult share of population, 









Observations  1137 1125 1554 1554 
R-squared  0.52 0.53 0.55 0.54 
Note. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent. t-stat in parentheses. 
Standard errors are adjusted for country-level clustering.  The constant 0.5 is being added to FDI per capita.  
The coefficients of "other characteristics" are similar to in Table and unreported.   36
Table 5.  Regressions Explaining FDI Allocation across Countries 
Dependent variable in all regressions is log constant (0.5) plus per capita FDI inflow. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expected GDP per capita growth  0.172 0.170 0.102 0.102 0.102 
  (3.83)*** (3.62)*** (2.89)*** (2.89)*** (2.89)*** 
Expected GDP per capita growth * China dummy      0.023   
      (0.46)   
volatility in GDP per capita growth  -3.089 -3.610 -6.215 -6.189 -6.229 
  (1.77)* (2.05)**  (3.28)*** (3.27)*** (3.29)*** 
GDP per capita growth volatility * China dummy       5.258 
       (0.81) 
Responsible government  0.031        
  (0.91)        
Responsible government * China dummy  -0.026        
  (0.20)        
Executive constraints   0.049      
   (0.53)      
Executive constraints * China dummy   -0.011      
   (0.04)      
Rule of law     0.238  0.239  0.238 
     (3.20)***  (3.22)***  (3.21)*** 
Rule of law * China dummy     0.076    
     (0.73)    
Observations  1137 1125 1554 1554 1554 
R-squared  0.49 0.48 0.54 0.54 0.54 
 Note.    *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent. t-stat in parentheses. Standard 
errors are adjusted for country-level clustering.  The constant 0.5 is being added to FDI per capita to take into account 
the fact that some FDI inflows have negative value.  We also control for other variables that are controlled in Table 3.   37
Table 6.  The relative importance of various factors in explaining China's FDI premium over 
countries with similar GDP per capita 
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2001 vs  
similar 
countries 
Difference in ln(FDI per capita)  1.01 1.21 1.01 1.21 1.01 1.21 1.01 1.21 
          
Government track record 
(1) Expected growth  103.9  91.4  102.3  89.9 62.1 54.6 69.4  61 
(2) GDP growth std. dev.  -8.1  11.9  -9.5  13.9  -16.3  24  -16  23.5 
     (1+2)  95.8 103.3 92.8 103.8 45.8 78.6 53.4 84.5 
(3)adult share of pop.   69.4  62.6  80  72.1 49.4 44.6 60.3 54.4 
     (1+2+3)   165.2 165.8 172.8 175.9  95.2 123.2  113.7  138.9 
          
(4) China dummy effects total  143.4 50.7 119.4 24.6 106.3 -9.7 130.5 13.8 
          
General development 
(5)  ln(GDP  per  capita)  -1.6 0.6 -2.8  1  -6.4 2.2 -7.9 2.7 
(6) Log(mean years of school)  -6.4  -7.2  -6.9  -7.7  5  5.6  3.9  4.4 
(7) Telephones per 1000   -2.9  20  -2.8  19  -1.5  10.2  -2.2  15.2 
(8) urban share of population  -34.9  -11.8 -34.4 -11.6 -22.2  -7.5  -21  -7.1 
    (5+6+7+8)  -45.8 1.6 -46.9 0.7 -25.1 30.3 -27.2 15.2 
          
Other characteristics 
(9)  ln(population)  -96.1  -82.2  -100.5  -86 -72.4 -62 -75.7  -64.8 
(10) trade_GDPt-1  -10.5  -8.6  -9.8  -8  -21.7 -17.6 -22.1 -17.9 
(11) exchange rate  2.8  -5  2.8  -5  2.9  -5.2  1.9  -3.4 
     (9+10+11)  -103.8 -68.6 -107.5 -99.0  -91.2 -84.8 -95.9 -86.1 
          
Institution  variable  -36.1 -30.4 -12.5 -10.5 43.6  17  14  -14 
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Figure 1.  Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to China, the US and the World  
Foreign direct investment inflow is expressed as per capita (in US dollars deflated to 2000). 
 
    
 
      
  
 